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Cash cropping, farm technologies, and deforestation: What are the connections? A 
model with empirical data from the Bolivian Amazon 
 
Summary  
Research suggests that cash-cropping is associated with deforestation.  We use 
three-year data (2000-2002) from 493 households to estimate the association between 
cash-cropping rice and deforestation. Doubling the area sown with rice is associated with 
a 26-30% increase of the area of forest cleared next cropping season.  We simulate the 
changes required to reach 1US$/person/day income with cash from rice.  We find that 
within 10 years 1) deforestation would triple, 2) work requirements would exceed 
household’s labor availability, and 3) fallows duration would decrease two-fold.  
Avoiding growing deforestation due to cash-cropping by smallholders requires increasing 
productivity, diversification of income sources, or both. 
 
Key words: Latin America, Bolivia, deforestation, cash crop, poverty alleviation, farm 
technology.
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1. Introduction 
The awareness of the many services provided by tropical forest (Costanza et al. 
1997) and the rapid increase in tropical deforestation has put forest at the center stage of 
the agenda for developers, conservationists, and policy-makers.  Researchers have 
studied many of the factors influencing deforestation, such as the opening of new roads 
(Chomitz & Gray 1996; Reid 2001), land property right issues (Deacon 1999; Alston et 
al. 2000; Godoy et al. 2001), the spread of industrial cash cropping (McMorrow & Talip 
2001), and slash-and-burn agriculture, cattle ranching, and logging activities (Hecht & 
Cockburn 1989; Palm et al. 2005).  Researchers have found that the various factors that 
cause deforestation are woven together in a complex net of interactions (Angelsen & 
Kaimowitz 1999).  Furthermore, authors find that the causes of deforestation could, in 
turn, result from deforestation.   
Because of the complexity of the issue, the variability across sites, and the lack of 
reliable empirical information, there is little consensus on an overall mechanism to 
explain deforestation (Kaimowitz & Angelsen 1998).  But the lack of empirical 
information is one of the main drawbacks on research on deforestation.  Kaimowitz and 
Angelsen (1998) reviewed 146 econometric models explaining deforestation and found 
that 24% were based on simulations and 23% draw on analytical models, i.e. theoretical 
mathematic equations including no empirical data.  Furthermore, among the 53% of the 
studies based on empirical data, 38 drew on secondary, national-level data. Only nine of 
the models reviewed (or 6% of the total) used household-level empirical data. The 
authors suggest that future studies of the causes of deforestation should focus on either 
household or regional-level data, because studies without a strong micro-level empirical 
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base are of little value: “There is no substitute for careful, quantitative micro-level 
empirical research, and the volume of such studies is not impressive.  Plausible 
theoretical mechanisms are often found to be of little empirical relevance” (Kaimowitz & 
Angelsen 1998: p. 99).  
This study has two parts.  In the first part, we draw on household data from 
Tsimane’ Amerindians, a horticultural and foraging society in the Bolivian Amazon, to 
assess how cash cropping by smallholders affects the clearance of neotropical forests.  
We study clearance of fallow and old-growth forest because previous research suggests 
that fallow forests harbor substantial biological diversity (Finegan 1996; Silver et al. 
1996; Smith et al. 1999), but we pay special attention to old-growth forests.  In the 
second part of the paper, we use the same data to simulate the consequences of having the 
rural poor cash crop their way out of poverty.  We focus on the consequences for the total 
area of forest clearance, for household labor requirements, and for fallow duration.  We 
pay special attention to fallow duration because previous research suggest that increased 
land scarcity reduces the fallow period (Coomes et al., 2000). 
This work contributes to the debate on the causes of deforestation in several ways. 
First, we use household-level data which, according to Kaimowitz and Angelsen (1998) 
is of great value and still relatively rare.  Second, we document deforestation by 
indigenous peoples.  Indigenous peoples do not account for a large share of deforestation, 
but this share could grow as indigenous people become more integrated into the market 
economy (Godoy 2001) or in response to population growth (Picchi 1991).  Third, we 
contribute to the debate on the effects of agricultural technology innovations on 
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deforestation.  The results of the simulations help formulate recommendations on the type 
of technologies needed to reconcile development and conservation of tropical forests.  
 
2. Cash cropping, farm technologies, and deforestation.   
There are many studies addressing the various causes of deforestation, but the 
number of studies focusing on the effect of cash cropping on deforestation using primary 
data is limited.  This empirical literature often studies the impact of cash cropping on 
deforestation through the introduction of new farm technologies (McMorrow & Talip 
2001; Angelsen & Kaimowitz 2001; Pendleton & Howe 2004).  
Part of the literature focusing on the effect of cash cropping on deforestation 
concurs that cash cropping increases deforestation.  For example, in a study in Thailand, 
Dearden (1995) found that the intensification of cash cropping of cabbage increased 
deforestation because cabbage has a low value compare with opium, which it was 
replacing.  In a household-level study in Cameroon, Mertens and colleagues (2000) found 
that deforestation increased as the marketing of food crops increased in response to 
economic crisis.  Other researchers, however, suggest that cash cropping does not 
necessarily leads to increasing deforestation.  For example, Tungittiplakorn and Dearden 
(2002) also found that intensification of cash cropping cabbage and carnations in 
Thailand reduced pressure on forest because the new cash crops required less land than 
traditional crops, and therefore allowed more people per unit of land.  Similarly, Perz 
(2004) found that raising rural incomes through agricultural diversity in forest frontier 
regions was not necessarily related to a reduction of forest cover.   
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Part of the debate on the effects of cash cropping on clearance of tropical forest 
relates to the use of new farm technologies for cash cropping.  While the common 
assumption is that technological improvements would decrease deforestation because an 
improvement in agricultural technology (in terms of production per unit of area) would 
reduce farmer’s need to keep clearing new lands (Holden 1993;  Jones et al. 1995; Palm 
et al. 2005), empirical data often shows that new agricultural technologies relate to more 
environmental degradation and deforestation (Humphries 1993; Marquette 1998; Godoy 
2001).  For example in a study on the changes among Yucatec Maya farmers from 
traditional shifting milpa agriculture to intensive horticultural production for the Mexican 
market, Humphries (1993) found that the process of agricultural intensification involved 
an increasingly sedentary  production which has heightened reliance on the use of 
chemicals with negative consequences for the environment.  In a study in the Ecuadorian 
Amazon, Marquette (1998) found that improvement in human welfare of settlers in the 
agricultural frontier was related to economic activities that increased the area of land 
cleared.  A third group of authors suggest that technological improvements might 
produce ambiguous results, depending on the type of technology (Angelsen & Kaimowitz 
2001).  For example, Pichón and colleagues (2002) found that in the Ecuadorian Amazon, 
farmers in agricultural frontiers adopted a low-intensity clearing land use strategy 
centering in coffee production, which generates less forest clearing.  However, farmers 
who could afford it, specialized in cattle raising, an activity that generated more income, 
but was related to less forest cover.    
In sum, the question on the impact of cash cropping on deforestation and the role 
that the introduction of new farm technologies might play in this relation, remains open. 
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3. Materials and Method. 
3.1. Tsimane’ agriculture  
Tsimane’ Amerindians live in the lowlands of Bolivia, mostly along the Maniqui 
and Apere rivers.  Detailed ethnographies of the Tsimane’ can be found in recent 
dissertations and books (Chicchon 1992; Ellis 1996; Reyes-García 2001; Byron 2003; 
Daillant 2003; Huanca 2005).   
Tsimane’ are hunters and horticulturalists who practice slash-and-burn agriculture 
to cultivate upland rice, maize, manioc, and plantains as main staples.  They also plant a 
variety of crops of smaller importance, such as sugar cane, peanuts, sweet potatoes, 
ahipa, and citrus (Piland 1991; Huanca 1999; Vadez et al. 2003).   Although Tsimane’ 
remain foragers and depend on forest resources, they are becoming increasingly 
dependent on farming.  Farm products represent more than 50% of Tsimane’ cash income 
(Reyes-García 2001).   
The Tsimane’ gather and farm their own land.  Tsimane’ land legally belongs to 
the ethnic group.  In a typical village, houses are scattered around the school, and 
households usually farm around the village in a radius of about 2km, giving around 1250 
hectares of land available per village. The land availability per household is directly 
linked to the number of household living in the village.  We found that villages varied 
from 10 to 70 households, giving a land availability of 18 to 125 ha per household. 
Tsimane’ farming is extensive and oriented to household consumption and sale.  
People usually abandon the plots after one or two cultivation cycles to clear another plot.  
In a recent study we show that the market economy is influencing Tsimane’ traditional 
farming practices, but not always in the expected direction. Unlike previous studies with 
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Amerindians that suggest that integration to the market stimulates specialization on a few 
crops (Godoy 2001), we found that Tsimane’ integration to the market economy does not 
decrease the diversity of crops grown (Vadez et al. 2004).  Households more integrated 
into the market cultivate larger areas with rice, a finding that is consistent with rice 
becoming a crop in high demand in the region and in the household economy of the 
Tsimane’.   
 
3.2. The importance of rice 
In Bolivia, the domestic demand for rice exceeds the domestic supply (Comisión 
Europea 2000).  The same situation occurs in the local market place, where the rice 
supplied by local producers, either Tsimane’ or colonists farmers, does not match 
demand.  Part of the rice consumed in the region is brought from other producing areas, 
such as the department of Santa Cruz, or from abroad.  Since rice demand is higher than 
the supply, there are strong incentives to increase rice production locally.   
Jesuit missionaries introduced rice into the Tsimane’ territory over 300 years ago 
(Perez-Diez 1983) and it has become a major income source for Tsimane’ households 
nowadays (Vadez et al. 2004).  In the 1950s, missionaries introduced improved rice 
varieties in the area together with manual sowing machines, technologies that are now 
widely used by the Tsimane’.  Later, colonist farmers introduced herbicides and 
pesticides for use in rice farming, but even today few Tsimane’ use those chemical 
inputs. 
Tsimane’ usually open farm plots between July and November, sow rice between 
August and December, and harvest rice during the rainy season, between January and 
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April.  Rice is both a staple and a cash crop and is cultivated on 60-80% of the surface of 
newly opened fields (Vadez et al. 2004), depending on the degree of household’s 
integration to the market economy.  Tsimane’ sell rice and other farm products in the 
town of San Borja (population ~19,000) but they also sell them to itinerant traders who 
ply the main rivers of the area. 
Insufficient rice supplies in San Borja, seasonally drive up the price of rice in the 
local market town (Figure 1).  For example, the price of rice in the local market was 0.28 
US$/kg shortly after harvest in March 2002, and about double (0.48 US$/kg) before the 
following harvest in January 2003.  However, Tsimane’ farmers do not take advantage of 
price fluctuations and sell most of their production in the few months following the 
harvest, when prices are at their lowest.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
  
3.3. Sample and data collection 
We collected information from the same households in 2000, 2001, and 2002. The 
total sample size was 715 households, among which 174 were interviewed during the 
three years, and 493 were interviewed at least two consecutive years. The surveys used a 
random sub-sample of 8-12 household per village. In this paper, we use only data from 
households for which we have repeated observations for at least two consecutive years.  
This sample selection allows us to partially abate biases from possible reverse causality 
and endogeneity, by regressing deforestation at time n+1 against explanatory variables 
occurring at time n.  The procedure represents a considerable improvement over earlier 
studies of deforestation that typically rely on cross-sectional information. 
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To estimate the area of forest cleared, we asked the male household head to report 
the area of all plots from old-growth or fallow forest own by the household during the last 
farming cycle and the type of forest cleared.  Self-reported estimates match closely the 
area cleared (Vadez et al. 2003).  We proxied rice cultivation by asking the male 
household head about the area sown with rice.  All measures of rice area in the surveys 
reflected the rice area sown in the previous cropping season.  We did not proxy rice 
cultivation with cash earnings from the sale of rice because rice sale volumes fluctuate 
over the year and the three surveys took place at different time (2000: June-September, 
2001: March-May, 2002: March-May).   
To estimate household cash income, we asked the male household head to report 
all the sources of income from sale, barter, and wage labor earned by all the adults in the 
household during the two weeks before the day of the interview.  We collected data on 
sale of farm and forest products disaggregated by product.  We estimate household 
consumption of farm goods by asking the female household head about the total amount 
of rice, cassava, and maize consumed in the household during the week before the 
interview.  We interviewed the village main authority to gather information on village 
road access and walking time to the nearest market town.  Table 1 contains definition and 
summary statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis.  Later we discuss how 
we deal with possible biases from omitted variables.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
3.4. Focus groups 
We used focus groups in 2001 and 2002 to gather information about the different 
work and technology inputs needed to study the cultivation of rice. To capture variation 
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in rice management, natural resource endowments, and farming skills, we carried out 
focus groups in half of the villages taking part in the study (n=18), at different distances 
from the town of San Borja.  We arrived to the villages the day before and informed 
people about the upcoming meeting.  We held focus groups with women and men 
together in the school building.  We asked villagers to tell us about the number of work 
days needed to carry out the different tasks of rice cultivation.  We wrote answers once 
villagers reached a consensus.  When groups disagreed, we took the mean of the different 
responses.  We also asked people to estimate yields of a standard variety of rice.  For 
technical inputs, we asked the time needed to fell trees with a chainsaw, to spread 
pesticide, and to sow rice with a manual sowing machine in a rice field of one hectare.  
Data on the cost of chemical inputs was obtained from stores in the town of San Borja. 
 
3.5.  The estimation model 
In the first part of the next section we estimate how cash cropping rice by 
smallholders affects deforestation, while controlling for other competing drivers of 
deforestation related to integration to the market, i.e. road access, distance to closest 
market town, cash income, and market dependence. By market dependence we mean the 
share of household consumption in total household income that comes from one’s own 
farm plots, so that: 
Market dependence = Cash income / (cash income + consumption value of rice, maize 
and cassava) 
We estimate the following model: 
[1] Yhvn+1 = a + bX hvn + dT hvn + fC1 j + g C2 n + h ihjn  
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Where Y is the area deforested by household h, in village v, in year n+1.  X is the 
area sown with rice of household h, in village v the previous year, n.  T is a vector of 
variables typically related to integration to the market (i.e., road access, distance to 
closest market town, cash income, and market dependence) of household h, in village v, 
in year n.  C1 is a set of dummy variables used to control for village fixed effects and C2 
is a set of dummies for the years to control for the confounding role of weather or year-
to-year variation.  To control for the effect of household size on deforestation, we used 
the household values of area sown with rice and area cleared divided by the number of 
adult equivalents per household.  The error term, h, captures exogenous shocks to 
deforestation (e.g., weather or prices). 
To deal with possible biases from omitted variables, we included village dummies 
in the regression model.  The procedure should allow us to control for the confounding 
role of village-level attributes, such as access to markets, or village endowments, such as 
soil fertility.  We did not have enough degrees of freedom to run a household fixed-effect 
model, so the estimated parameters we present might be biased by unobserved household 
attributes that affect both rice cultivation and deforestation.  For example, some 
households might have access to farm technologies, credit, and labor help that would 
affect both how much rice they cultivate and how much forest they clear.  We run 
regressions with clustering of households by villages because households are nested in 
villages and because households from a same village are more likely to be similar in their 
patterns of deforestation than households from different villages.  Clustering is necessary 
because the units of observation, the households, are not independent of one another but 
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clustered in natural units (villages).  Clustering affects the estimated standard errors, 
making them more conservative, but does not affect the estimated slope coefficient.  
 
3.6. The simulation model 
In the second part of the results section, we explore the consequences of Tsimane’ 
trying to exit poverty by increasing the production of rice.   First, we estimate the amount 
of forest a household needed to cultivate with rice to reach 1US$/person/day (poverty 
line).  Second, we asses whether households would be able to meet the additional labor 
requirements of increased cash cropping and the possible role of farm technologies to 
ease household labor constraints.  Third, we explore the consequences of the increase in 
area cleared on fallow duration.  We simulate five scenarios:  
(i) Subsistence scenario is a baseline scenario used for comparison. Households keep 
up with current area clearing to meet their needs.  We adjust for a demographic 
increase of 4.76%/year (Reyes-García 2001). 
(ii) Poverty Line + Traditional Practice scenario: Households choose to reach the 
poverty line using traditional farming practices to cultivate rice.  
(iii) Poverty Line + Farm Technology scenario: Households choose to reach the poverty 
line with new farm technologies (i.e., herbicides and chainsaws).  
(iv) Poverty Line + Rice Price Increase scenario: same as (i) but rice price increases by 
3%/year.  
(v) Poverty Line + Encroachment scenario: Same as (i) but encroachment represents an 
increase in the number of households per village of 3%/year. We assume that 
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encroachers follow the same deforestation patterns as Tsimane’ households who 
choose to reach the poverty line.   
Appendixes A and B contain the assumptions, formulas, and empirical data used 
for the simulation of the five scenarios.  Although most of the parameters used are based 
on empirical data, various assumptions that we make may not fully mimic future reality.  
For instance, household split over time or may migrate out of the area, or may diversify 
their income resources by pursuing non-farm occupations.  Or education may lower the 
rate of demographic increase.  However, we kept the assumptions simple to make the 
simulation easy and open to further exploration.  Our estimates are conservative because 
we simulated the changes that would occur to reach the poverty threshold of only 1 
US$/person/day, but people would probably aspire to go beyond this bare minimum line. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Rice micro-economy 
During 2000, 2001, and 2002 households earned US$ 13.2,  9.9, and  6.8 from 
rice in the two weeks prior to the interview, equivalent to about 26%, 21%, and 23% of 
their total cash income (Table 2). We found large variation between households regarding 
their involvement in rice trade.  For 50% of households, rice represented 0%, 7% and 
14.7% of their income in 2000, 2001 and 2002.  At the other extreme, for 10% of the 
households, rice represented 82%, 58% and 53% of their total income in 2000, 2001, and 
2002.  Variation in rice trade and the fact that households that cultivate large areas with 
rice also sell much rice (Vadez et al. 2004) gives us an ideal setting to estimate the 
relation between rice cultivation and deforestation. 
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INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
We first used data from focus groups to asses the various cost (in labor and 
money) incurred under the traditional method of cultivating rice, that is without modern 
inputs.  We found that one hectare of rice requires about 101.9 person-days of work from 
field opening to rice harvest (Table 3).  Participants estimated an average yield of 1540 
kg/ha, which would give a gross income of 176 US$/ha (1 kg of rice= 0.114 US$).  We 
divided the gross income by labor input, to calculate the return on labor investment for 
rice: each day allocated to rice production provides an average wage of 1.72 US$/day, 
about 66% of the local daily average wage for unskilled labor in the area, such as 
working on cattle ranches and in logging concessions.  Daily wages in these occupations 
vary by season but average 2.60 US$/day.  Participants estimated that a typical adult can 
dedicate at most 170 days/year to cultivate rice, since rice does not grow all year long and 
people have other activities.  Assuming that a typical household is composed of three 
adults (Reyes-García, 2001), every household would have at its disposal about 510 days-
person available to cultivate rice every year. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
    We used the same focus groups to assess how modern technology would affect 
work inputs to cultivate rice, with a particular attention to: (i) the use of chain saws to fell 
trees, (ii) the use of manual sowing machines, and (iii) the use of herbicides to replace 
manual weeding.  The chainsaw work was estimated at two days/ha to fell all trees and 
would cost 21.84 US$/ha.  The cost of using a manual sowing machines is 0.05 US$/ha. 
Spraying herbicides would cost 9.87 US$/ha. Total input costs for using the three 
technologies is 31.76 US$/ha, which decreases the income per hectare by about 18%, 
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from 176 US$/ha with traditional practice to 144.24 US$/ha with modern technology.  
The use of modern technology increased by 70% the returns to labor investment, from 
1.72 US$/day with traditional practice to 2.94 US$/day with modern technology by 
reducing work input by 52%, from 101.9 work person-days to 49.1 work person-days 
(Table 3).  So, the use of modern farm technologies largely decreases the work 
requirement to cultivate rice while it increases the return to labor investment almost to the 
level of the local unskilled wage labor.  
 
4.2. Regressions 
4.2.1. Rice cash cropping  
We used expression [1] to estimate the relation between the area of rice sown one 
year and the total area cleared the following year.  Using untransformed data, we found 
that the area of rice sown in year n bore a highly significant relation with the total area 
deforested in year n+1.  An additional hectare of rice planted was associated with 0.30 
more hectares deforested in the subsequent year (Table 4).  Results were similar whether 
using village and year dummies or not.  We re-estimated expression [1] taking the 
logarithm of total area deforested and area planted with rice to obtain elasticity 
coefficients  (i.e., the percentage change in the dependent variable from a percentage 
change in the explanatory variables).  We found that the area planted with rice bears a 
significant positive association with the area deforested.  A two-fold increase in the area 
cultivated with rice correlated with a 26-27% increase in the total area deforested by a 
household during the following cropping season (Table 4).  Results were similar when 
using village and year dummies.  
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INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
To assess whether rice cultivation is also associated with greater deforestation of 
old-growth forest, we re-estimated expression [1] using clearance of old-growth forest, 
instead of total area cleared, as a dependent variable.  For this estimation, we used a tobit 
regression since the dependent variable was censored at zero, because 48% of households 
did not clear old growth forest.  The area sown with rice in year n was associated with a 
significant increase in the clearing of old-growth forest the following year (Table 5).  An 
additional hectare cultivated with rice was associated with a 0.17 and 0.18 hectare 
increase in the clearing of old-growth forest.  The lower estimate is for a regression 
controlling for village fixed effects and for year and the higher estimate comes from a 
regression without such controls.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
We also took the logarithm of old-growth forest and rice area and ran the same 
regressions to obtain elasticity coefficients. We found that the area sown with rice (in 
logarithms) bore a highly significant relation with the deforestation of old-growth forest 
in the next cropping season. A doubling in the area of rice was associated with a 26% 
increase in the clearing of old-growth forest in the regression using dummy variables to 
control for village and year. In the regression with no such control, a doubling in the rice 
area was associated with a 28% increase in the deforestation of old-growth forest (Table 
5).  Since many households did not clear old-growth forest, we added +1 to the dependent 
variable. The regressions retained their significance but elasticity coefficients were much 
lower than in the tobit regressions, i.e. 0.032 (sd=0.009; p<0.002) in the regression using 
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dummy variables to control for village, and 0.030 (sd=0.009; p<0.02) in the regression 
using no such controls.  
In sum, the area cultivated with rice on year n is associated positively with the 
amount of area cleared by the household in year n+1, even after controlling for village 
fixed effects and year of the survey.  Results suggest that the observed association 
between cash cropping and deforestation does not reflect village attributes or time variant 
aspects.  Rather, deforestation probably has more to do with household characteristics. 
 
4.2.2. Other variables of integration to the market.  
We estimate the correlation between deforestation and two village-level variables: 
walking time to the nearest market town and road access for vehicles. Walking time to 
the nearest market town bore no significant associations with deforestation, neither when 
using total area cleared (p<0.31) nor when using the logarithm of old-growth forest 
cleared (p<0.12) (Table 5).  Permanent road access to the market town had no significant 
relation with total or old-growth forest deforestation in any of the regressions.  
We then looked at two other household-level proxies for integration to the market: 
household cash income and household market dependence. In the regression with raw 
data for total deforestation as a dependent variable, there was no significant association 
between cash income in year n and total area cleared in year n+1 (column 1 and 2, Table 
4).  In the regression using logarithm data and no dummy variables to control for village 
and year fixed effects, there was a significant association between cash income and total 
deforestation (column 4, Table 4).  In the tobit regression with clearing of old-growth 
forest without controlling for village and year fixed effects (column 2, Table 5), we found 
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a significant relation between cash income and clearing of old-growth forest.  In the 
regressions using logarithm data of old-growth forest, there was no significant association 
between cash income and clearing of old-growth forest (column 3 and 4, Table 5).  
Household’s market dependence in year n bore no significant association with 
total deforestation in year n+1 (Table 4).  The explanatory variable had only a weak 
association with the level of deforestation of old-growth forest in the regression using the 
logarithm of old-growth forest, and without using dummy variable to control for year and 
village fixed effects (p<0.05).  A doubling in the degree of market dependence then was 
associated with 56% more deforestation of old-growth forest (column 4, Table 5). 
In sum, among the various explanatory variables for deforestation, the cultivation 
of rice in year n was the one bearing the most effect on the amount of area cleared in the 
year n+1.  The finding supports the intuition that there may be strong incentives for rice 
production in the study area.   
 
4.3. Can poor rural households cash crop themselves out of poverty? 
We have seen that Tsimane’ households obtained on average 21-26% of their cash 
earnings through the sale of rice and that 25% of all the households obtained up to 40-
50% of their cash income through rice.  Since rice is in high demand on the local market 
and does not meet local demand, and since Tsimane’ income per capita is only 0.90 
US$/person/day (Godoy et al., 2002), below the 1US$/person/day poverty line defined by 
the World Bank, it is reasonable to assume that Tsimane’ would rely on the sale of rice as 
a major way to increase income.  Next we simulate what would happen to land and labor 
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requirements and to fallow duration if Tsimane’ decide to cash crop rice to reach the 
poverty line.  
 
4.3.1. Enough land to go beyond the poverty line? 
Keeping up with current needs and simply adjusting to demographic increase, the 
subsistence scenario, a typical Tsimane’ household would need to clear 2.4 ha within 10 
years and about 3.8 ha within 20 years, which represents a 60% and 160% increase in the 
current level of deforestation (Fig. 2a). Under the Poverty Line + Traditional Practice 
scenario, a typical Tsimane’ household would need to clear 4.9 ha within 10 years, or 
over three times more than they currently cut.  Within 20 years, Tsimane’ households 
would need to clear 7.9 ha, over five times more than they currently cut (Figure 2a). 
Forest clearance under the Poverty Line + Farm Technology scenario is fairly similar to 
the Poverty Line + Traditional Practice scenario.  
The simulation shows that simply adjusting to demographic increases with current 
needs would require large increases in the amount of area cleared to sow rice.  For that 
reason, we explore a scenario where an increase in the price of rice would raise the gross 
income per hectare.  Under the Poverty Line + Rice Price Increase scenario, forest 
clearance would be 3.1 ha in year 0, about twice as high as the current level of forest 
cleared by households.  It would then decrease to 2.8 ha within 10 years, about equal than 
the subsistence scenario, and then to 2.5 ha within 20 years, lower than clearance in the 
subsistence scenario, but still 66% higher than clearance at time 0 in the subsistence 
scenario. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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4.3.2. Enough work to meet the poverty line? 
Since reaching poverty line would require large increase in the area sown with 
rice, the option that Tsimane’ households meet the poverty threshold through rice 
cultivation may become primarily a matter of work availability.  We found that in the 
subsistence scenario, households would have sufficient labor availability for the next 20 
years, when they will need 387 person-days/household to meet labor requirements.  In the 
Poverty Line + Traditional Practice scenario, a typical household would need 316 days 
to reach the poverty line in year 0, i.e. 163 more days than under the subsistence scenario.  
A household will need 503 days within 10 years to reach the poverty line (Figure 2b). 
After 10 years, households choosing to reach the poverty line with no technology input 
would not be able to meet the labor requirements.  In contrast, under the Poverty Line + 
Farm Technology scenario, the labor requirement would be very close to the labor 
requirement of the subsistence scenario. Households would need 169 person-days of 
work in year 0, only 16 more days than under subsistence, and 269 persons-days within 
10 years, only 26 more days than under subsistence, but 230 days less than in the Poverty 
Line + Traditional Practice scenario.  Even after 20 years, the Poverty Line + Farm 
Technology scenario would remain largely below the 510 person-day ceiling of available 
labor per household. 
Although the use of simple farm technologies may help households meet the labor 
requirements of reaching 1 US$/person/day, the work demand increases over time and 
would end up imposing a binding constraint on households.  In the Poverty Line + Rice 
Price Increase scenario, the labor requirement would decrease over time because forest 
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clearance needed to reach the poverty line would also decrease (Figure 2a).  Under that 
scenario, in years 0, 10, and 20 a household would need 316, 287, and 254 days-person of 
work to reach the poverty line. 
 
4.3.3. Fallow duration to reach the poverty line 
If poor households want to reach the poverty line by selling rice, the fallow 
duration will be linked to the number of households in the village.  We assume a typical 
village size of 35 households and a fallow period of at least 11 years to allow secondary 
forest re-growth and to avoid land degradation (Metzger 2002).  We compare the fallow 
duration under different scenarios to this benchmark using the same simulations as in the 
previous sections. Then, we add a simulation for the Poverty Line + Traditional Practice 
scenario in a small village of 15 households. We  also consider the case of encroachment 
by colonists, equivalent to a  3%/year increase in the number of households in the village 
(Appendix B).  
With current land availability and a household clearance of 1.5 ha/year, the fallow 
duration is about 24 years in a village of 35 households.  Under the subsistence scenario, 
the fallow duration would decrease to about 9.5 years within 20 years in a typical large 
village of 35 households. Under the Poverty Line + Traditional Practice, the fallow 
duration would decrease to 11.6 years in year 0, about two-fold reduction compared with 
the subsistence scenario, and to 7.3 years within 10 years, below the 11 years minimum 
fallow period to prevent land degradation. Under the Poverty Line + Farm Technology 
scenario, the fallow duration would decrease to 10.4 years in year 0 and to 6.5 years 
within 10 years, below the 11 years fallow period, and about the same than the Poverty 
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Line + Traditional Practice scenario.  By contrast, under the Poverty Line + Traditional 
Practice scenario in a small village of 15 households, the fallow duration would be 27.0 
years in year 0, it would decrease to 17.0 years within 10 years, and to 10.6 years within 
20 years. 
Under the Poverty Line + Rice Price Increase in a village of 35 households, the 
fallow duration would be about 11.6 years in year 0, it would increase to 12.7 years 
within 10 years, and to 14.3 years within 20 years.  Under the Poverty Line + 
Encroachment scenario, the fallow duration would dramatically decrease over time and 
would be only 5.4 years within 10 years and about 2.5 years within 20 years. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
Cash cropping rice one year correlated with the total area cleared by the 
household the following cropping season.  Every additional hectare cultivated with rice in 
year n was associated with 0.26-0.30 more hectares deforested in year n+1, and with 
0.17-0.28 more hectares of old-growth forest cleared in year n+1.  Though the increase is 
so far modest, the fact that cash cropping has a significant effect on the clearing of old-
growth forest, available only in distant villages, suggests that cash cropping rice is 
expanding to remote areas of the tropical forest.  The high demand for rice in the local 
market and the importance of rice in household’s economy suggests that rice is likely to 
fuel more deforestation in coming years.  We found no association between the level of 
deforestation and having all-year road access to the villages.  We found a weak 
correlation between the walking time to the nearest market and the amount of 
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deforestation.  In fact, certain villages do have all year long road access by vehicle, but 
cannot rely on a regular transportation service on these roads to sell rice.  
Our simulations show that if people try to exit poverty by intensifying cash 
cropping the environment and the household’s time allocation are likely to suffer.  
Reaching the poverty line of 1 US$/person/day by cash cropping rice would require 
doubling in the area of forest cleared per household.  If one adds demographic increase, 
the level of deforestation would triple in a decade.  Two possible options to alleviate the 
pressure on land for the Tsimane’ would be an increase in the price of rice, or to 
substitute rice with another, more profitable cash crop. 
Reaching the poverty line would also induce important changes in the 
household’s time allocation because expanding rice crops would require additional work. 
We estimate that within 10 years, households without access to new farm technology that 
face a high growth in population would not be able to provide the work needed to reach 
the poverty line.  Labor-saving technological improvements could ease the labor 
constraints, but only temporarily because even under such a scenario the demographic 
increase will soon overwhelm the benefits of technological improvements.  
Reaching the poverty line by cash cropping rice will also reduce the duration of 
the fallow, in agreement with previous work (Coomes et al., 2000), especially in large 
villages facing land scarcity, and more so if outside encroachment occurs.  Land 
constraint will eventually also affect households in small villages.  Land-saving 
technological improvement might ease the constraints.  
Although rice cash cropping is currently having only modest impacts on the level 
of forest area cleared, the socio-economic context in which poor rural households live – 
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the desire to increase welfare, the high demand for farm products, and the demographic 
increase - suggest that cash cropping rice might increase, and deforestation along with it. 
In light of the low returns to labor input of rice and the high demand for land to cultivate 
rice, the reconciliation of forest conservation and economic development requires new 
alternatives.  We conclude with three recommendations to help reconciliate forest 
conservation and economic development related to cash cropping by small holders.  
First, an increase in the price of rice would increase the profitability per hectare 
and decrease the amount of forest to reach the poverty line, and would have direct effects 
on the labor requirement and fallow duration.  An increase in the price of rice would 
benefit the economy of smallholders, but would lower the real income of poor urban 
households that buy rice.  An alternative option is to find a more profitable cash crop. 
Research is needed to explore potential high profitability market crops. 
Second, the large labor demand of rice cultivation would boost the use of the 
locally available farm technologies to reduce labor, namely chainsaw and herbicides. The 
use of chemicals in farming have risks for users and for the environment, but they seems 
unavoidable.  Extension work is needed to help farmers use those technologies in 
appropriate ways.  
Third, herbicides and chain saws are labor-saving technologies but they do not 
increase the productivity of rice. Agriculture research and extension in the area are 
neededs to increase the productivity of rice.  An area of research is to find a sustainable 
way of intensifying the production of cash crops on the same land.  Nitrogen being the 
most limiting edaphic factor for crop production (Sinclair and Vadez 2002), the use of 
legumes that fix nitrogen might provide a sustainable way of increasing agricultural 
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production. Work is needed to find and introduce such legumes, as they need to be 
marketable, and adopted by the population.  
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Table 1 
Description and summary statistics of the variables measured in surveys (2000-2002). 
Variable Definition Mean Sd Obs. 
Dependent     
Total clearing Total area cleared per households, in hectares 0.266 0.273 493 
Old-growth 
forest clearing 
Area of old-growth forest cleared per 
household, in hectares 
0.120 0.204 463 
     
Explanatory     
Rice area Total area planted with rice per household, in 
hectares 
0.222 0.201 469 
Walking time Time to the nearest market town, in hours 9.85 10.22 470 
Road access Accessibility throughout the year to the 
village with motor vehicle (0=no access; 
1=access) 
0.39 0.49 470 
Cash income Total household income in past two weeks 
from sales, barter, and wage labor, in US$. 
0.032 0.061 472 
Market 
dependence 
Ratio of cash income/(cash income + 
consumption value of rice + maize + cassava)
0.313 0.304 466 
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Table 2 
Rice in the Tsimane’ economy (2000-2002). Data are mean ± standard deviation.  
 2000 2001 2002 
Rice incomea  13.2±32.9 9.9±21.5 6.8±14.1 
Household earningsb 44.5±57.1 43.9±74.3 29.7±35.6 
Rice % of total earnings 25.9±33.5 21.3±26.3 22.6±25.1 
Percentile 
25  0 0 0 
50  0 7 15 
75  51 41 40 
90  82 58 53 
    
Nº Observations 511 378 331 
Time survey July-September March-April February-April 
a.-Sum of rice transactions in cash and in kind, in US$ for past two weeks. 
b.- Sum of sales and wage labor, in US$ for past two weeks. 
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Table 3 
Summary statistic for labor inputs in rice cultivation and other economic parameters. 
Data are the mean (± sd) of data collected on focus groups on 18 villages. 
Activities Rice, traditional Rice, modern 
Field preparation 
Slashing (days/ha) 14.1±5.4 14.1±5.4 
Felling (days/ha) 22.9±5.9 0 
Burning-Cleaning (days/ha) 4.3±5.6 4.3±5.6 
Crop management 
Sowing (days/ha) 11.7±5.1 2.3±1.0 
Weeding (days/ha) 23.2±8.0 2 a 
Harvesting (days/ha) 26.4±4.5 26.4±4.5 
Technology inputs  
Chainsaw b (US$/ha) 0 17.84 
Sowing machinec (US$/ha) 0 0.05 
Herbicided (US$/ha) 0 9.87 
Economic parameters 
Yield (kg/ha) 1540±241 1540±241 
Total work (days/ha) 101.9 49.1 
Total input (US$/ha) 0 31.76 
Net income (US$/ha) 176 144.24 
Productivity of work (US$/day) 1.72 2.94 
a Data estimated from information with Tsimane’ key informants. 
b Two days wage (7.89 US$/ha), 10 liters of gas (3.95 US$/ha), cost and maintenance (10 
US$/ha); 
c Cost 5.26 US$ and would work for about a 100 ha minimum, that is 0.05 US$/ha;  
d Chemical inputs: 6.58 US$/ha, plus 3.29 US$ per ha for rental, based on the pump price. 
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 Table 4 
Regression with total deforestation, first with raw data (column 1 & 2), and with the 
logarithm of deforestation and rice area (column 3 & 4). Data are the regression 
coefficients with standard deviation in brackets. Significance at the 99, 95 and 90% level 
indicated with ***, **, and *.  
Deforestation Raw data Logarithm 
Rice area  
 
0.300*** 
(0.096) 
0.306*** 
(0.097) 
- - 
Log(rice area) 
 
- - 0.263*** 
(0.044) 
0.276*** 
(0.040) 
Walking time 
 
NA -0.0017 
(0.0013) 
NA -0.0056 
(0.0045) 
Road access 
 
NA 0.0023 
(0.0299) 
NA 0.0272 
(0.0824) 
Cash income 
 
0.211 
(0.186) 
0.345 
(0.157) 
0.812 
(0.443) 
1.166** 
(0.389) 
Market 
dependence 
0.054 
(0.078) 
0.041 
(0.057) 
0.087 
(0.168) 
0.104 
(0.132) 
     
Observations 463 463 449 449 
R2 0.14 0.07 0.21 0.12 
Dummy variables Yes No Yes No 
NA, non applicable. Variables taken out of regressions using village dummies. 
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Table 5 
Regression with old-growth forest deforestation, first with raw deforestation data 
(columns 1 & 2), and with the logarithm of old-growth forest and rice area (columns 3 & 
4). Data are the regression coefficients with standard deviation in brackets. Significance 
at the 99, 95 and 90% level indicated with ***, **, and *.  
Old-growth forest  Tobit regression Log of old-growth forest  
Rice area  
 
0.175** 
(0.076) 
0.178** 
(0.077) 
- - 
Log(rice area) 
 
- - 0.256*** 
(0.076) 
0.278*** 
(0.074) 
Walking time 
 
NA 0.0026 
(0.0016) 
NA -0.0096 
(0.0059) 
Road access 
 
NA -0.0056 
(0.0334) 
NA -0.0025 
(0.0986) 
Cash income 
 
0.225 
(0.272) 
0.654*** 
(0.253) 
0.295 
(0.507) 
0.053 
(0.517) 
Market 
dependence 
0.071 
(0.063) 
0.057 
(0.055) 
0.397 
(0.336) 
0.564** 
(0.235) 
     
Observations 463 463 259 259 
R2 0.29 0.05 0.32 0.15 
Dummy variables Yes No Yes No 
NA, non applicable. Variables taken out of regressions using village dummies. 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Retail rice prices in San Borja, Bolivia, in 2002-2003. 
 
Figure 2. Consequences of reaching up to the poverty line with a 4.76% demography 
increase on: forest clearance per household (Fig. 2a), work required to cultivate (Fig. 2b), 
fallow duration in situation of varying land availability (Fig. 2c). 
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Appendix A. Basic calculations and assumptions of simulations 
Area cleared under the different scenarios. The additional forest clearance needed in year 
0 to reach the 1 US$/person/day (365 US$/person/year) poverty threshold was 
[2] FC0 = CCR + [(PL-I)*HHC/(RGM*CRPL)]/PRO   
Where FC0 is the forest cleared in year 0; CCR is the current clearing amount, 
1.5ha/hh/year (Vadez et al. 2004); PL is the poverty line (365 US$/person/year); I is the 
average Tsimane’ income per person (cash + consumption), estimated to 332 
US$/person/year (Godoy et al. 2002); HHC is the household composition, 6.5 
persons/household (this study); PRO is the share of newly opened fields planted with 
rice, 76% (this study); RGM is the rice gross income, 176 US$/ha with no modern 
technology input (this study); CRPL is the contribution of rice to meet poverty line, 
assumed to be 100%. 
Then, FCn the additional forest clearance needed in year n was such as: 
FC n = FC0*(1 + DI/100)n  
[3] FC n = [1.5 + [(33)*6.5/RGM]/0.76]* (1 + 4.76/100) n     
Where DI is the demographic increase, estimated to 4.76% (Reyes-García 2001). 
 
Work needed under different scenarios. From expression [3], we calculated the work 
required to reach poverty line in year n, such as: 
Work = RLR*FCn  
[4] Work = RLR*[1.5 + [(33)*6.5/RGM]/0.76]*(1 + 4.76/100) n     
Where: RLR, the rice labor requirement varies from 102 days-person/ha (Poverty 
Line + Traditional farming) to 49.1 days-person/ha (Poverty Line + Farm technology). 
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Fallow duration under the different scenarios. From expression [3], we calculated the 
fallow duration to reach poverty line in year n, such as: 
Fallow duration = LA/(VS*FCn) 
[5] Fallow duration = LA/(VS*[1.5 + [(33)*6.5/RGM]/0.76]*(1 + DI/100) n   
Where LA, the land availability per village and is estimated to 1250ha, and VS, the 
village size varies between 15 households (small villages) and 35 households (large 
villages). 
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Appendix B. Summary of the main assumptions made in the different scenarios 
concerning the area to be cleared per household, the fallow duration, and the labor 
requirement, to meet poverty line with a 4.76% demographic increase. Main varying 
parameter is indicated in bold. 
Scenarios Main assumptions 
 Area to be cleared and 
Work 
Fallow 
Subsistence Fn = 1.5*(1+DI/100)n with 
DI = 4.76%/y 
VS = 35 hh 
PL + Tradional 
Practice 
RGM = 176 US$/ha; DI = 
4.76%/y 
VS = 35 hh 
PL + Farm 
technology 
RGM = 144 US$/ha; DI = 
4.76%/y 
VS = 35 hh 
PL + Rice price 
increase 
RGM = 176 US$/ha; DI = 
4.76%/y; Price increase = 3%/y 
VS = 35 hh 
PL + Tradional 
Practice 
- RGM = 176 US$/ha; DI = 
4.76%/y; VS = 15 hh 
PL + 
Encroachment 
- VS increase = 3%/year 
due to encroachment:  
VSn = 15*(1+3/100)n 
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